As Myanmar Continues Digital Repression, Starlink Is the Only Lifeline
This story and image were produced and published by Asia Democracy Chronicles.
Since grabbing power yet again in February 2021, Myanmar’s military has systematically targeted communication networks in areas beyond its control, repeating a tactic it used even before the coup. For the junta, blocking the internet weakens coordination among resistance forces, as well as restricts public access to information.
As of October 2025, 131 townships – representing 36.6 percent of the country – remain under an internet blackout. In northwestern Myanmar, Sagaing Region has 28 of its 37 townships cut off from the internet. That means more than three-fourths of Sagaing, a core area of resistance, lives in digital darkness.
In such areas, tech billionaire Elon Musk’s satellite-based internet service Starlink has emerged as a fragile yet vital bridge connecting Myanmar’s civilians and resistance groups. It also serves as their link to the outside world. Especially in the last two years, civilians, local administration bodies, and resistance forces have increasingly relied on Starlink to stay in touch, share updates, and coordinate essential activities.
“Starlink allows us to connect and attend capacity-building programs online,” says a member of a local People’s Administration body in Sagaing. “Many of us cannot meet in person because of airstrikes and the ongoing conflict. We also receive intelligence and airstrike warnings through the internet. I cannot imagine our lives and our work without it.”
A resident of Mandalay Region’s Singu Township, now under the control of the parallel National Unity Government (NUG) and People’s Defense Forces (PDF), says that his family bought a Starlink kit some time ago for their personal use.
“With the blackout imposed by the junta, this is the only way we can connect with each other and with the outside world,” says Ko Arr Ni (not his real name). “When there was no internet and no Starlink, we felt completely cut off.”
Risky connections
The Christian humanitarian aid organization Free Burma Rangers was the first to introduce Starlink to areas controlled by resistance groups in July 2023. A few months later, NUG launched the campaign Federal Net, aiming to expand internet access in areas under its administration.
Since then, nearly 200 Starlink sets have been installed to provide stable connections, enabling both administrative coordination and online education. In 78 villages across 22 townships in Sagaing Region, communities now have access to Federal Net, serving around 123,000 daily users. The network ensures uninterrupted connectivity for students, civil servants, and humanitarian actors.
Yet some observers are now urging NUG and its supporters to think of alternatives to Starlink because of serious downsides to its use.
For one, tech experts say that the radio signals and heat emissions of Starlink devices can potentially be detected by military drones and thermal imaging equipment, raising fears that Starlink users could inadvertently attract airstrikes from the military.
For another, the use of Starlink by scam centers in Southeast Asian nations, including Myanmar, has attracted the attention of U.S. authorities, and there have been worries that Washington may pressure Starlink’s parent company SpaceX into disabling devices across the region because of this.
The U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee has in fact begun an investigation on Starlink use by these scam centers, which have bilked billions of U.S. dollars from people across the globe. This October, a SpaceX executive announced that the company had disabled “more than 2,500 Starlink Kits in the vicinity of suspected ‘scam centers’” in Myanmar.
No further details were given regarding when and where exactly SpaceX disabled the kits, but several media reports have noted that the announcement came after the junta said that it had seized 30 Starlink devices during a raid on a major scam center in Myawaddy in Karen State, along the Thai border.
Interestingly, local residents in the border areas reported that some Starlink accounts in Karen State near the Thai border suddenly became inaccessible around Oct 16.
Other areas that are under resistance forces and the NUG have also seen Starlink service for public use temporarily banned or disabled, such as the Ta’ang area of Northern Shan State, some parts of Karenni State, and Rakhine State.
Usually, though, these are moves by the resistance to avoid military airstrikes that may be inadvertently aided by Starlink kits. But PDF members and those in local administration are allowed to continue using their devices within certain limits.
A tech expert familiar with communication systems explains that Starlink terminals emit radio waves and generate heat signatures that can be picked up by drones – many supplied by China and Russia – equipped with night-vision thermal cameras. Although there is no definitive proof that the junta is directly using these signals to target strikes, evidence suggests a troubling pattern.
A Myanmar conflict researcher, for instance, points out that airstrikes have become increasingly precise, often preceded by drone surveillance and jamming of communication signals.
“It is very possible that the junta uses drones to detect Starlink signals or heat emissions before launching attacks,” the researcher notes. In several cases, jammers were deployed just before airstrikes, indicating an effort to cut communications and isolate targets.
A PDF member, who says that they temporarily ban or restrict Starlink use because they “are very cautious” adds: “There have been incidents where Starlink users leaked information to the junta, intentionally or not, which led to attacks on public gatherings.”
Resistance forces impose restrictions
In many resistance-held areas, residents are required to register and follow strict security guidelines to operate Starlink. Resistance forces have temporarily shut down internet cafés during periods when there is a threat of an airstrike, and people caught still using the internet are fined. Sometimes, their devices are confiscated, but returned once the threat is over.
In Mandalay and Sagaing, where the threat of airstrikes is high, private device owners are allowed to use them only for household purposes, and not for commercial use. Those caught violating this rule may have to pay fines and have their devices confiscated.
But such temporary shutdowns and restrictions have encountered complaints from rights advocates, as well as from residents in the affected areas.
Digital rights activists argue that if internet and communication access were open, people would be better informed and able to prepare early warnings, potentially saving lives during attacks.
Residents meanwhile often resent the restrictions on Starlink use, largely because the resistance forces have not fully explained why these are necessary and just how long they are supposed to last.
Just this October, a widely circulated video showed a confrontation between a family of Starlink users and Mandalay PDF members in Singu. The PDF tried to confiscate the family’s devices because, the PDF said, these were being used for commercial purposes. Chaos ensued after the family refused and accused the PDF of acting like the military junta.
Those who purchased the kits for their own use also rue having to set aside these even temporarily, considering they paid a lot for them.
Says Ko Arr Ni, the Singu resident whose family has a Starlink kit: “We purchased the Starlink device at a very high price, registered it with the local administration, and used it strictly for private communication, not for commercial purposes. However, some people claim to use it privately but actually operate it for business. There needs to be more education and awareness for such users.”
“When large groups gather around Starlink devices,” he continues, “problems may arise, but I don’t fully understand how information could be leaked to the junta. I believe pro-military individuals have other ways to pass on information. I’m not an expert.”
Bootleg bandwidth
Although Starlink is not licensed to operate in Myanmar, its services can be accessed via “‘spillover’ bandwidth from satellites serving other countries,” according to a Voice of America report, citing an analyst from the Myanmar internet Project. The devices themselves are smuggled through Bangladesh, India, and Thailand.
Prices for the kits have decreased in the Myanmar black market since 2023, but they remain expensive. Depending on where it is bought, a Starlink kit can cost anywhere from MMK 8 million ($3,810) to MMK 200 million ($9,525).
This is why the NUG’s Federal Net campaign has become crucial, as it allows usage of Starlink’s internet service without putting individual users in the poorhouse. The campaign funds purchase of the kits by activist groups and resistance forces, which then set up internet cafes where they charge fees that range from MMK 1,500 to 2,000 ($0.71 to $0.95) an hour. NUG itself gets funds from donations, largely from the Myanmar diaspora, and various fund-raising activities.
Resistance forces now control the majority of areas bordering Bangladesh and India, easing the import of Starlink kits through these regions. On the Thai side, though, reports of confiscation of the devices, as well as arrests of those trying to cross into Myanmar with them, are increasing.
Some observers believe Thai authorities now equate the devices with the scam centers, which Bangkok and Beijing – and ostensibly Nay Pyi Taw – are seeking to crush. Observers say that the junta is playing up the scam hubs’ Starlink connection to encourage calls to have the internet service cut completely in Myanmar, thereby dealing a digital deathblow to the resistance groups.
“If Starlink is shut down, the worst-case scenario is that the entire population living in resistance-controlled areas would lose all means of communication,” economist and China expert Antonio Graceffo wrote in a recent Mizzima article. “In the best case, the resistance could slowly transition to a Chinese system once they secure the funding to do so, but in that case, Beijing would be listening.”
Social scientist and communications expert Dr. Surachanee Sriyai, for her part, argues that dependence on foreign-owned digital infrastructures – whose vulnerabilities include getting caught in “geopolitical power plays” – is unwise for both countries and resistance movements.
“For resistance groups, creative thinking and a deeper understanding of communicative modalities are necessary,” said Surachanee, a visiting fellow with the media, technology, and society program at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. “They should consider their target audience and the type of information they aim to convey before selecting a means of communication. Not all forms of communication require internet access – it should not even be the default approach in conflict-prone or vulnerable areas.”
“Localized mesh networks, which allow devices to communicate without centralized internet providers, offer a potential solution,” she wrote in a March 2025 Fulcrum piece . “This technology enables computers and devices to connect directly without passing through any central authority. For example, the Serval Project was launched after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti to create a disaster-proof wireless network that enables cellular-like communications in the absence of cellular signals. Similarly, the Open Mesh Project seeks to provide open and free communications to citizens facing digital repression from their governments.”
Should all these still fail, Myanmar’s civilians and resistance forces can take the cue from liberated areas still without internet access: radio and print media for information, and handheld transceivers and range extenders for communication.
For the resistance, the message remains the same with or without internet: No giving up.
